Last night I heard Ehud Barak on TV saying something just as dangerous and unworkable, explaining how Israel can hold onto small "settlement blocks" and have "peace with the Arabs." There are two major problems with it.Opposition leader Shaul Mofaz (Kadima) told the The New York Times that he would "respond to 100% of the territorial demands of the Palestinians" if elected Prime Minister.
“I intend to replace Netanyahu,” Mr. Mofaz, 63, said. “I will not join his government.”
Mofaz said that he believed Israel should keep the main settlement blocs, but that he would give the Palestinian Authority as much land from sovereign Israeli ground as he kept from Judea and Samaria.
He added that he believes it is possible to reach an agreement on the borders and security within one year.
When asked about Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria living in communities he would cede to the Palestinian Authority, Mofaz said, "If they're given the right incentives they will leave their homes. Those who do not, we would have to evacuate [them]."
- it's technically/physically/geographically unworkable
- the Arabs have never agreed to give us peace for such an agreement
Neither of these two former IDF heads are thinking past the rush of headline grabbing. None of their ideas will give Israel peace and security, and they're ignoring the very basic fact that the Arabs are more interested in Haifa, Tel Aviv and other pre-1967 Israeli cities.
IMRA has an interesting article that reveals the total lack of thought that had gone into Yossi Beilin's Oslo Accords. It was created in a total vacuum, without taking any security and long-term planning into account.
Shavit: When you entered the Oslo process, Rabin Peres and you, was it clear to you that this was going to a Palestinian state?That superficial "NOW" mindset reminds me too much of Ehud Barak's campaign pledge to withdraw from southern Lebanon. It was one of the most foolish and dangerous moves Israel has ever made. Read this excerpt from Dr. Mordechai Nisan's Did Israel Betray Its Lebanese Allies?:
Beilin: No. It is very interesting to note that the talks of the soul regarding "where will this process lead" took place only between the sides, not within them.within the Labor party and within the government and within the negotiating team I don't recall any real and serious discussion of the final solution.
Shavit: I don't understand. In 1992 you were elected to the government. In 1993 you created the Oslo process. At no stage did you ask yourselves where this all was leading to?
Failure after dangerous failure, and that Leftist ideology still reigns. Our enemies assist in promoting people like Barak, Mofaz, Peres and Beilin. Even post-Disengagement, as the Arab terrorists continue to launch deadly missiles at Israel's south, as far as Eilat we keep hearing that all we have to do is give our enemies our precious Land for "peace."
For Israeli and SLA personnel, officers and soldiers alike, the events of late May unfolded without prior preparation, notice, or warning.
On Sunday, May 21, the SLA, in somewhat unclear circumstances, withdrew from the military outpost at Taibe, situated five kilometers from Kibbutz Misgav-Am. Israeli officers then announced that "Hizbullah is coming" and an air of danger filled the south. The SLA's Shi‘i brigade 70 collapsed, and many of its soldiers turned themselves over to Hizbullah. (They would subsequently be sent to Beirut for trial.)3 On Monday, May 22, Israeli officers told SLA secret-intelligence-services personnel in south Lebanon to leave. On Tuesday, May 23, Colonel Faris Qasis, the commander of the western brigade stationed at Bint Jbail, was ordered to leave with his troops for the gates on the Israeli border. That same day, a domino-like collapse encompassed both the western and eastern sectors of south Lebanon; the Druze brigade under the command of Colonel Nabih Abu-Rafi‘a fell by the early afternoon. The central sector— dominated by Marj Ayoun, which served as the SLA headquarters and the Israeli-Lebanese liaison unit—was abandoned later in the day.
The gates on the Israeli-Lebanese border, from Rosh Hanikra in the west to Metulla in the east, were opened to allow the southerners to flee to safety in Israel. The full disarray and end of the SLA followed inevitably. SLA heavy weapons were ordered brought to Majidiye on the Israeli border. All SLA personnel in the central sector opposite the Fatma gate were told to run to Israel, and thousands fled for their lives.4
A soldier named Roni, with six years experience in the SLA, related that on "Monday night at eleven o'clock we got a call from the Israelis telling us that Hizbullah is approaching and telling us to leave."5 Another soldier said, "We could have stopped them with our weapons," but the IDF did not shoot and would not allow the SLA to shoot either. A couple from the village of Kawkaba fled with their two children, leaving behind their two-story house, shoe store, and car.Another man from Klay'a, whose family members had been working with Israel in military and economic affairs since 1975, fled leaving behind extensive personal property and assets.6 All together, about 6,500 dispossessed Lebanese fled into Israel, which was unprepared for such large numbers of refugees. Apparently, Israeli authorities had expected only 500-plus Lebanese senior intelligence personnel and officers, and their families, to end up in Israel.
Thus did the decision for an IDF withdrawal cause the SLA to disintegrate and create havoc among its forces. Southerners feared being massacred immediately by Hizbullah or being tried and tortured as "enemies of the state" by the Beirut authorities.
The Arabs don't promise peace; they just up their demands, because they don't want peace with Israel. They just want us dead and gone.
Here's the latest edition of Caroline Glick's Latma.