If you scrape off the political "conclusions" from the Winograd, you do get a strong condemnation of Olmert and the way his government ran the war. This editorial from Ha'aretz, hat tip IMRA, says it well.
The people didn't want a poltical report, but Olmert appointed the committee.
This reminds me of the Sin of the Spies, in the Bible. The twelve tribal leaders were only asked to report the situation, not to draw conclusions. The Land was rich. The fruit brought back proved it, but instead of using that to encourage the People, they frightened the People by ignoring G-d's power and all that had happened up to then.
Ten of the spies spoke logically, as if the Hebrews were ordinary people, not G-d's chosen. As reasonable pragmatists, they insisted that there was no way we could defeat the powerful locals.
Winograd describes a totaly faulty government with "disabled" thinking processes which turned what should have been a victory into defeat. But then it follows the "party line" and explains that compromises must be made for "peace," and that it's good that the war brought international forces to "protect" us.
Davka, that's the biggest tragedy of the Second Lebanese War. The State of Israel gave up on sovereignty. Just like the punishment in Biblical times, when our entrance to the Holy Land was delayed for decades, Peace will now be delayed as punishment for the sins of Winograd and Olmert.
Showing posts with label Winograd Commission. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Winograd Commission. Show all posts
Friday, February 1, 2008
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Winograd Committee January 30, 2008 remarks
Thanks to IMRA
Wednesday, January 30, 2008
Full text: Winograd Committee January 30, 2008 remarks
Winograd Committee Press Release - January 30, 2008
January 30, 2008
Press Release
Good Evening.
1. About an hour ago we submitted the Final Report of the Commission to
Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006 to the Prime minister, Mr. Ehud
Olmert, and to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak.
2. The task given to us was difficult and complex. It involved the
examination of events in 34 days of fighting, and the scrutiny of events
before the war, since the IDF had left Lebanon in 2000. This covered
extensive, charged and complex facts, unprecedented in any previous
Commission of Inquiry.
3. The fact that the Government of Israel opted for such an examination, and
that the army conducted a large number of inquires of a variety of military
events, are a sign of strength, and an indication that the political and
military leaders of Israel are willing to expose themselves to critical
review and to painful but required mending.
4. We have included in the classified version of the Report all the relevant
facts we have found concerning the 2nd Lebanon war, systematically and in a
chronological order. This presentation of the factual basis was an important
part of our work. It is reasonable to assume that no single decision maker
had access to a similar factual basis. In this task we had a unique
advantage over others who have written about this war, since we had access
to a lot of primary and comprehensive material, and the opportunity to
clarify the facts by questioning many witnesses, commanders and soldiers,
including bereaved families.
5. For obvious reasons, the unclassified Report does not include the many
facts that cannot be revealed for reasons of protecting the state's security
and foreign affairs. We tried, nonetheless, to balance between the wish to
present the public with a meaningful picture of the events and the needs of
security. We should note that we did not take the mere fact that some data
has already been published in the media as a reason for including it in our
unclassified Report.
6. We, the members of the Commission, acted according to the main objectives
for which the Commission was established - to respond to the bad feelings of
the Israeli public of a crisis and disappointment caused by the results of
the 2nd Lebanon war, and from the way it was managed by the political and
military echelons; and the wish to draw lessons from the failings of the war
and its flaws, and to repair what is required, quickly and resolutely. We
regarded as most important to investigate deeply what had happened, as a key
to drawing lessons for the future, and their implementation.
For complete text click this.
Wednesday, January 30, 2008
Full text: Winograd Committee January 30, 2008 remarks
Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Take the time to at least read this and think
about it for 60 seconds before opening your mouth and you are way ahead of
the overwhelming majority of talking heads appearing on the various Israeli
television channels tonight.
There is one particularly bizarre phrase in the remarks of Judge Eliyahu
Winograd: "We should also note that the war had significant diplomatic
achievements. SC resolution 1701, and the fact it was adopted unanimously,
were an achievement for Israel. This conclusion stands even if it turns out
that only a part of the stipulations of the resolution were implemented or
will be implemented, and even if it could have been foreseen that some of
them would not be implemented."
Does this mean that Winograd considers a piece of paper to be a "
significant diplomatic achievement" even if it can be foreseen that the
piece of paper won't be implemented?
This is an extremely dangerous position to take, given that there is
tremendous concern that the current "piece process" is exactly that: an
attempt to reach a photo opportunity signing ceremony in which a piece of
paper is signed with great fanfare even though it can be foreseen that the
piece of paper won't be implemented.
Winograd Committee Press Release - January 30, 2008
January 30, 2008
Press Release
Good Evening.
1. About an hour ago we submitted the Final Report of the Commission to
Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006 to the Prime minister, Mr. Ehud
Olmert, and to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak.
2. The task given to us was difficult and complex. It involved the
examination of events in 34 days of fighting, and the scrutiny of events
before the war, since the IDF had left Lebanon in 2000. This covered
extensive, charged and complex facts, unprecedented in any previous
Commission of Inquiry.
3. The fact that the Government of Israel opted for such an examination, and
that the army conducted a large number of inquires of a variety of military
events, are a sign of strength, and an indication that the political and
military leaders of Israel are willing to expose themselves to critical
review and to painful but required mending.
4. We have included in the classified version of the Report all the relevant
facts we have found concerning the 2nd Lebanon war, systematically and in a
chronological order. This presentation of the factual basis was an important
part of our work. It is reasonable to assume that no single decision maker
had access to a similar factual basis. In this task we had a unique
advantage over others who have written about this war, since we had access
to a lot of primary and comprehensive material, and the opportunity to
clarify the facts by questioning many witnesses, commanders and soldiers,
including bereaved families.
5. For obvious reasons, the unclassified Report does not include the many
facts that cannot be revealed for reasons of protecting the state's security
and foreign affairs. We tried, nonetheless, to balance between the wish to
present the public with a meaningful picture of the events and the needs of
security. We should note that we did not take the mere fact that some data
has already been published in the media as a reason for including it in our
unclassified Report.
6. We, the members of the Commission, acted according to the main objectives
for which the Commission was established - to respond to the bad feelings of
the Israeli public of a crisis and disappointment caused by the results of
the 2nd Lebanon war, and from the way it was managed by the political and
military echelons; and the wish to draw lessons from the failings of the war
and its flaws, and to repair what is required, quickly and resolutely. We
regarded as most important to investigate deeply what had happened, as a key
to drawing lessons for the future, and their implementation.
For complete text click this.
The Winograd Mega Market
Something for Everybody!
Yes, that's the Winograd Report, a long, convoluted compositon of words in which almost all sectors in the Israeli political, military and civilian spheres can find something they agree with, and something they disagree with. Yes, a supermarket, a mega market, with an enormous variety of products in great and confusing quantities.
Personally, the thing that bothers me the most is the blame on the army, as if the army is independent of its political bosses.
Think about it:
- Who provides the army with its budget?
- Who decides on its goals and aims?
- Who appoints its top commanders?
I can go on with those sorts of questions, but the answer is the same. It's The Israeli Government, Israeli politicians. So who is really responisble for the poor performance of the Army?
- Ehud Olmert
- Ehud Barak
- Ariel Sharon
- Shaul Mofaz
- Amir Pertz
- Shimon Peres
- Tzachi Hanegbi and all of the many Israeli politicians who have been in positions of influence over the years...
As many people with more patience than I have continue to go over the report, more and more "peculiar statements" will be discovered in the report, showing how political and unreliable it really is, a snow job for sure. G-d's joke is to give us weather to match.
I'll start with the statement my husband found:
Israel must - politically and morally - seek peace with its neighbors
and make necessary compromises.
That was not what they were supposed to "judge." That's a politically ideological statement at odds with reality and many of us Israelis.
IMRA found something else which rankled them.
...32. ... At the same time, we also note that...We have not found that the political echelon was aware of the details of the fighting in real time, and we have not seen a discussion, in either the political or the military echelons, of the issue of stopping the military operation after the Security Council resolution was adopted"
The media here is ignoring the fact that Winograd Report condems the fact that the government, Olmert, Peretz etc hadn't a clue as to what was really happening. 
That's why Olmert is happy. The media is protecting him.
The worst thing is that even though, according to the official government statements, Israel went to war to free Ehud, Eldad and Gilad,
they are still being held captive by the terrorists.
Wednesday, January 30, 2008
Winograd Won't Get To The Root of The Problem
The Israeli media is hopping, getting all ready for the official full report from the Winograd Commission.
By the time the Second Lebanese War had ended, the Israeli public was demanding an inquiry. Canny ol' Olmert decided to appoint his own judges to judge his war leadership. That's the Winograd Commission. He gave it a rather narrow scope. Also, unlike previous commissions of inquiry, Winograd held secret sessions.
Olmert should have given it wider scope, which would throw blame on Ehud Barak for his abandonment of Southern Lebanon. That would have been the green light for the commission to totally destroy Barak's career, including his lucrative lecture business. From the time Barak gave orders to the IDF to flee from Southern Lebanon until the war began, the terrorists there set up a military infrastructure to attack Israel's north. Barak was also the IDF Chief of Staff who is responsible for the lowering of standards and the dependence on technology, rather than first hand military skills and training.
It may be that Olmert sees Barak as an ally, not a competitor, and for that reason he prefers to protect him.
One thing for sure, Olmert will not retire no matter what the commission recommends.
Just another two months until the two year pension for MK's kicks in for Olmert's coalition....
By the time the Second Lebanese War had ended, the Israeli public was demanding an inquiry. Canny ol' Olmert decided to appoint his own judges to judge his war leadership. That's the Winograd Commission. He gave it a rather narrow scope. Also, unlike previous commissions of inquiry, Winograd held secret sessions.
Olmert should have given it wider scope, which would throw blame on Ehud Barak for his abandonment of Southern Lebanon. That would have been the green light for the commission to totally destroy Barak's career, including his lucrative lecture business. From the time Barak gave orders to the IDF to flee from Southern Lebanon until the war began, the terrorists there set up a military infrastructure to attack Israel's north. Barak was also the IDF Chief of Staff who is responsible for the lowering of standards and the dependence on technology, rather than first hand military skills and training.
It may be that Olmert sees Barak as an ally, not a competitor, and for that reason he prefers to protect him.
One thing for sure, Olmert will not retire no matter what the commission recommends.
Just another two months until the two year pension for MK's kicks in for Olmert's coalition....
Tuesday, May 8, 2007
Pears and Apples?
Or maybe it's more like string beans and bananas?
According to this Newsweek article, the American public isn't really happy with their politicians vying for the Presidency. Israelis aren't crazy about our choices either.
In some way they're all the same, insulated by self-serving staff and led by pollsters.
The need for millions of dollars to cover campaign expenses and pay all those salaries have made politicians all over the world, marketing-sensitive puppets, rather than inspiring ideologues.
Abraham Lincoln could never have been elected in today's world. His plain face and long speeches wouldn't go over well on the media. Pictures of FDR being lifted into his wheelchair would make the front pages, and JFK's casual affairs would be prime time news.
Americans vote for politicians who are like their plastic-wrapped individual slices of cheese.
In Israel, it's harder to "wrap" the politicians, since within minutes you can find someone who went to the same nursery school, youth movement, army unit or doctor. The rules are getting tougher as Katzav and Ramon have discovered the hard way.
I have another question.
Does Israel need the same sort of politician they have in the United States?
The United States is considered as "the leader of the free world." Its security is firm. Its existence isn't in danger. No matter who's elected the next president, it really won't make any difference in substance. The "War in Iraq" is a skirmish, thousands and thousands of miles away from its borders. Yes, soldiers are being killed, but not in numbers which affect more than their families and friends. And as the politicians say, America did not have to start that war. The United States was not in any danger. Personally, I can't understand why thousands of Iraqis and Americans had to die to give Sadaam Hussein a "fair trial." He was executed, and people are still dying.
In Israel the stakes are bigger, much bigger. Our country is being threatened by the Arabs on our borders and even further afield. They've already, in the 59 years the State of Israel has existed, started wars and kept up rocket and terror attacks all the time.
We don't need pre-packaged politicians with American election advisers. That's how Hizbullah had such an easy time arming South Lebanon to attack us last summer. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who is actually running again, at the advice of his American advisor, campaigned that he would withdraw the troops if elected. That's what he did, and to "sweeten it" for the terrorists, he did it so quickly that enormous quantities of expensive military equipment was left for the terrorists to use against us. For some peculiar reason, the Winograd Report glossed over it, just blaming those who were running the country last summer.
Israel does not need well-coiffed politicians or those who've had plastic surgery to make their eyes seem more open and alert.
We need true patriots who see the needs of our embattled country before any other considerations. That's the only type of person who can truly lead us.
G-d willing
According to this Newsweek article, the American public isn't really happy with their politicians vying for the Presidency. Israelis aren't crazy about our choices either.
In some way they're all the same, insulated by self-serving staff and led by pollsters.
The need for millions of dollars to cover campaign expenses and pay all those salaries have made politicians all over the world, marketing-sensitive puppets, rather than inspiring ideologues.
Abraham Lincoln could never have been elected in today's world. His plain face and long speeches wouldn't go over well on the media. Pictures of FDR being lifted into his wheelchair would make the front pages, and JFK's casual affairs would be prime time news.
Americans vote for politicians who are like their plastic-wrapped individual slices of cheese.
In Israel, it's harder to "wrap" the politicians, since within minutes you can find someone who went to the same nursery school, youth movement, army unit or doctor. The rules are getting tougher as Katzav and Ramon have discovered the hard way.
I have another question.
Does Israel need the same sort of politician they have in the United States?
The United States is considered as "the leader of the free world." Its security is firm. Its existence isn't in danger. No matter who's elected the next president, it really won't make any difference in substance. The "War in Iraq" is a skirmish, thousands and thousands of miles away from its borders. Yes, soldiers are being killed, but not in numbers which affect more than their families and friends. And as the politicians say, America did not have to start that war. The United States was not in any danger. Personally, I can't understand why thousands of Iraqis and Americans had to die to give Sadaam Hussein a "fair trial." He was executed, and people are still dying.
In Israel the stakes are bigger, much bigger. Our country is being threatened by the Arabs on our borders and even further afield. They've already, in the 59 years the State of Israel has existed, started wars and kept up rocket and terror attacks all the time.
We don't need pre-packaged politicians with American election advisers. That's how Hizbullah had such an easy time arming South Lebanon to attack us last summer. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who is actually running again, at the advice of his American advisor, campaigned that he would withdraw the troops if elected. That's what he did, and to "sweeten it" for the terrorists, he did it so quickly that enormous quantities of expensive military equipment was left for the terrorists to use against us. For some peculiar reason, the Winograd Report glossed over it, just blaming those who were running the country last summer.
Israel does not need well-coiffed politicians or those who've had plastic surgery to make their eyes seem more open and alert.
We need true patriots who see the needs of our embattled country before any other considerations. That's the only type of person who can truly lead us.
G-d willing
Tuesday, May 1, 2007
The Winograd Report
Quoted here is the key, the gist of the report. For the entire text, click here for IMRA.
8. The core of the interim report is a detailed examination of the
decisions of senior political and military decision-makers concerning the
decision to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the two soldiers on
the morning of July 12th. We start with the decision of the government on
the fateful evening of the 12th to authorize a sharp military response, and
end with the speech of the Prime Minister in the Knesset on July 17th, when
he officially presented the campaign and its goals. These decisions were
critical and constitutive, and therefore deserve separate investigation. We
should note that these decisions enjoyed broad support within the
government, the Knesset and the public throughout this period.
9. Despite this broad support, we determine that there are very
serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We impose
the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the
minister of defence and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a
decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they
were made. Howwever,, there are many others who share responsibility for the
mistakes we found in these decisions and for their background conditions.
10. The main failures in the decisions made and the decision-making
processes can be summed up as follows:
a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike
was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan,
based on carefull study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena
. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed
the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant
political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would
inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was
not other effective military response to such missile attacks than an
extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the
missiles were fired - which would have a high "cost" and which did not
enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with
the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.
b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government
did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing
the policy of 'containment', or combining political and diplomatic moves
with military strikes below the 'escalation level', or military preparations
without immediage military action -- so as to maintain for Israel the full
range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in
strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more
comprehensive and encompassing picture.
c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through
ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that
ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it.
The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing
its nature and implications. They authorized to commence a military campaign
without considering how to exit it.
d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not
be achieved, and in part were not achieveable by the authorized modes of
military action.
e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action
possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action,
and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early
mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a
ground operation would be required.
f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they
failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality
on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it
was publicly states that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But
the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement.
11. The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the
Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the
(outgoing) Chief of Staff. We single out these three because it is likely
that had any of them acted better - the decisions in the relevant period and
the ways they were made, as well as the outcome of the war, would have been
significantly better.
12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.
a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility
for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army. His
responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war
stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led
the decisions which were taken.
b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that
no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one.
Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of
the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options
available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation
with others, especially outside the the IDF, despite not having experience
in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not
adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him
before the fateful decisions of July 12th.
c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the
campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no
serious discussion of the relationships between these goals and the
authorized modes of military action. He nade a personal contribution to the
fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.
d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans once it became clear that
the assumptions and expectations of Israel's actions were not realistic and
were not materializing.
e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment,
responsibility and prudence.
13. The Minister of Defence is the minister responsible for overseeing
the IDF, and he is a senior member in the group of leaders in charge of
political-military affairs.
a. The Minister of Defence did not have knowledge or experience in
military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good
knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve
political goals.
b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period
without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional
experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did
not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he
attended.
c. The Minister of Defence did not act within a strategic conception of
the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF's operational plans and
did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF;
and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action
presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions
made was mainly pointillist and operational. He did not put on the table -
and did not demand presentation - of serious strategic options for
discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.
d. The Minister of Defence did not develop an independent assessment
of the implications of the complexity of the front for Israel's proper
response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations between military and
diplomatic moves within it. His lack of experience and knowledge prevented
him from challenging in a competent way both the IDF, over which he was in
charge, and the Prime Minister.
e. In all these ways, the Minister of Defence failed in fulfilling his
functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defence during the war
impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges.
14. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the supreme commander of the IDF, and the
main source of information concerning the army, its plans, abilities and
recommendations presented to the political echelon. Furthermore, the COS's
personal involvement with decision making within the army and in
coordination with the political echelon were dominant.
a. The army and the COS were not prepared for the event of the
abduction despite recurring alerts. When the abduction happened, he
responded impulsively. He did not alert the political leaders to the
complexity of the situation, and did not present information, assessments
and plans that were available in the IDF at various levels of planning and
approval and which would have enabled a better response to the challenges.
b. Among other things, the COS did not alert the political echelon to
the serious shortcomings in the preparedness and the fitness of the armed
forces for an extensive ground operation, if that became necessary. In
addition, he did not clarify that the military assessments and analyses of
the arena were that a military strike against Hezbollah will with a high
probability make such a move necessary.
c. The COS's responsibility is aggravated by the fact that he knew well
that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate
knowledge and experience in these matters, and by the fact that he had led
them to believe that the IDF was ready and prepared and had operational
plans fitting the situation.
d. The COS did not provide adequate responses to serious reservation
about his recommendations raised by ministers and others during the first
days of the campaign, and he did not present to the political leaders the
internal debates within the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals
and the authorized modes of actions.
e. In all these the Chief of Staff failed in his duties as commander in
chief of the army and as a critical part of the political-military
leadership, and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility and
judgment.
15. Concomitantly we determine that the failures listed here, and in the
outcomes of the war, had many other partners.
a. The complexity of the Lebanon scene is basically outside Israel's
control.
b. The ability of Hezbollah to sit 'on the border', its ability to
dictate the moment of escalation, and the growth of its military abilities
and missile arsenal increased significantly as a result of Israel's
unilateral withdrawal in May 2000 (which was not followed, as had been
hoped, by The Lebanese Army deploying on the border with Israel.
c. The shortcomings in the preparedness and the training of the army,
its operational doctrine, and various flaws in its organizational culture
and structure, were all the responsibility of the military commanders and
political leaders in charge years before the present Prime Minister,
Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff took office.
d. On the political-security strategic level, the lack of preparedness
was also caused by the failure to update and fully articulate Israel's
security strategy doctrine, in the fullest sense of that term, so that it
could not serve as a basis for coping comprehensively will all the
challenges facing Israel. Responsibility for this lack of an updates
national security strategy lies with Israel's governments over the years.
This omission made it difficult to devise an immediate proper response to
the abduction, because it led to stressing an immediate and sharp military
strike. If the response had been derived from a more comprehensive security
strategy, it would have been easier to take into account Israel's overall
balance of strengths and vulnerabilities, including the preparedness of the
civil population.
e. Another factor which largely contributed to the failures is the
weakness of the high staff work available to the political leadership. This
weakness existed under all previous Prime Ministers and this continuing
failure is the responsibility of these PMs and their cabinets. The current
political leadership did not act in a way that could compensate for this
lack, and did not rely sufficiently on other bodies within and outside the
security system that could have helped it.
f. Israel's government in its plenum failed in its political function
of taking full responsibility for its decisions. It did not explore and seek
adequate response for various reservations that were raised, and authorized
an immediate military strike that was not thought-through and suffered from
over-reliance on the judgment of the primary decision-makers.
g. Members of the IDF's general staff who were familiar with the
assessments and intelligence concerning the Lebanon front, and the serious
deficiencies in preparedness and training, did not insist that these should
be considered within the army, and did not alert the political leaders
concerning the flaws in the decisions and the way they were made.
16. As a result of our investigation, we make a number of structural and
institutional recommendations, which require urgent attention:
a. The improvement of the quality of discussions and decision making
within the government through strengthening and deepening staff work; strict
enforcement of the prohibition of leaks; improving the knowledge base of all
members of the government on core issues of Israel's challenges, and orderly
procdures for presentation of issues for discussion and resolution.
b. Full incorporation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in security
decisions with political and diplomatic aspects.
c. Substantial improvement in the functioning of the National Security
Council, the establishment of a national assessment
team, and creating a center for crises management in the Prime Minister's
Office.
17. We regard it is of great importance to make findings, reach
conclusions and present recommendations on the other critical issues which
emerged in this war. We will cover them in the final report, which we strive
to conclude soon. ...
For the entire text, click here for IMRA.
8. The core of the interim report is a detailed examination of the
decisions of senior political and military decision-makers concerning the
decision to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the two soldiers on
the morning of July 12th. We start with the decision of the government on
the fateful evening of the 12th to authorize a sharp military response, and
end with the speech of the Prime Minister in the Knesset on July 17th, when
he officially presented the campaign and its goals. These decisions were
critical and constitutive, and therefore deserve separate investigation. We
should note that these decisions enjoyed broad support within the
government, the Knesset and the public throughout this period.
9. Despite this broad support, we determine that there are very
serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We impose
the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the
minister of defence and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a
decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they
were made. Howwever,, there are many others who share responsibility for the
mistakes we found in these decisions and for their background conditions.
10. The main failures in the decisions made and the decision-making
processes can be summed up as follows:
a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike
was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan,
based on carefull study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena
. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed
the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant
political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would
inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was
not other effective military response to such missile attacks than an
extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the
missiles were fired - which would have a high "cost" and which did not
enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with
the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.
b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government
did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing
the policy of 'containment', or combining political and diplomatic moves
with military strikes below the 'escalation level', or military preparations
without immediage military action -- so as to maintain for Israel the full
range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in
strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more
comprehensive and encompassing picture.
c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through
ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that
ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it.
The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing
its nature and implications. They authorized to commence a military campaign
without considering how to exit it.
d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not
be achieved, and in part were not achieveable by the authorized modes of
military action.
e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action
possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action,
and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early
mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a
ground operation would be required.
f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they
failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality
on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it
was publicly states that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But
the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement.
11. The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the
Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the
(outgoing) Chief of Staff. We single out these three because it is likely
that had any of them acted better - the decisions in the relevant period and
the ways they were made, as well as the outcome of the war, would have been
significantly better.
12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.
a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility
for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army. His
responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war
stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led
the decisions which were taken.
b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that
no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one.
Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of
the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options
available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation
with others, especially outside the the IDF, despite not having experience
in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not
adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him
before the fateful decisions of July 12th.
c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the
campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no
serious discussion of the relationships between these goals and the
authorized modes of military action. He nade a personal contribution to the
fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.
d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans once it became clear that
the assumptions and expectations of Israel's actions were not realistic and
were not materializing.
e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment,
responsibility and prudence.
13. The Minister of Defence is the minister responsible for overseeing
the IDF, and he is a senior member in the group of leaders in charge of
political-military affairs.
a. The Minister of Defence did not have knowledge or experience in
military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good
knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve
political goals.
b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period
without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional
experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did
not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he
attended.
c. The Minister of Defence did not act within a strategic conception of
the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF's operational plans and
did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF;
and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action
presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions
made was mainly pointillist and operational. He did not put on the table -
and did not demand presentation - of serious strategic options for
discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.
d. The Minister of Defence did not develop an independent assessment
of the implications of the complexity of the front for Israel's proper
response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations between military and
diplomatic moves within it. His lack of experience and knowledge prevented
him from challenging in a competent way both the IDF, over which he was in
charge, and the Prime Minister.
e. In all these ways, the Minister of Defence failed in fulfilling his
functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defence during the war
impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges.
14. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the supreme commander of the IDF, and the
main source of information concerning the army, its plans, abilities and
recommendations presented to the political echelon. Furthermore, the COS's
personal involvement with decision making within the army and in
coordination with the political echelon were dominant.
a. The army and the COS were not prepared for the event of the
abduction despite recurring alerts. When the abduction happened, he
responded impulsively. He did not alert the political leaders to the
complexity of the situation, and did not present information, assessments
and plans that were available in the IDF at various levels of planning and
approval and which would have enabled a better response to the challenges.
b. Among other things, the COS did not alert the political echelon to
the serious shortcomings in the preparedness and the fitness of the armed
forces for an extensive ground operation, if that became necessary. In
addition, he did not clarify that the military assessments and analyses of
the arena were that a military strike against Hezbollah will with a high
probability make such a move necessary.
c. The COS's responsibility is aggravated by the fact that he knew well
that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate
knowledge and experience in these matters, and by the fact that he had led
them to believe that the IDF was ready and prepared and had operational
plans fitting the situation.
d. The COS did not provide adequate responses to serious reservation
about his recommendations raised by ministers and others during the first
days of the campaign, and he did not present to the political leaders the
internal debates within the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals
and the authorized modes of actions.
e. In all these the Chief of Staff failed in his duties as commander in
chief of the army and as a critical part of the political-military
leadership, and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility and
judgment.
15. Concomitantly we determine that the failures listed here, and in the
outcomes of the war, had many other partners.
a. The complexity of the Lebanon scene is basically outside Israel's
control.
b. The ability of Hezbollah to sit 'on the border', its ability to
dictate the moment of escalation, and the growth of its military abilities
and missile arsenal increased significantly as a result of Israel's
unilateral withdrawal in May 2000 (which was not followed, as had been
hoped, by The Lebanese Army deploying on the border with Israel.
c. The shortcomings in the preparedness and the training of the army,
its operational doctrine, and various flaws in its organizational culture
and structure, were all the responsibility of the military commanders and
political leaders in charge years before the present Prime Minister,
Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff took office.
d. On the political-security strategic level, the lack of preparedness
was also caused by the failure to update and fully articulate Israel's
security strategy doctrine, in the fullest sense of that term, so that it
could not serve as a basis for coping comprehensively will all the
challenges facing Israel. Responsibility for this lack of an updates
national security strategy lies with Israel's governments over the years.
This omission made it difficult to devise an immediate proper response to
the abduction, because it led to stressing an immediate and sharp military
strike. If the response had been derived from a more comprehensive security
strategy, it would have been easier to take into account Israel's overall
balance of strengths and vulnerabilities, including the preparedness of the
civil population.
e. Another factor which largely contributed to the failures is the
weakness of the high staff work available to the political leadership. This
weakness existed under all previous Prime Ministers and this continuing
failure is the responsibility of these PMs and their cabinets. The current
political leadership did not act in a way that could compensate for this
lack, and did not rely sufficiently on other bodies within and outside the
security system that could have helped it.
f. Israel's government in its plenum failed in its political function
of taking full responsibility for its decisions. It did not explore and seek
adequate response for various reservations that were raised, and authorized
an immediate military strike that was not thought-through and suffered from
over-reliance on the judgment of the primary decision-makers.
g. Members of the IDF's general staff who were familiar with the
assessments and intelligence concerning the Lebanon front, and the serious
deficiencies in preparedness and training, did not insist that these should
be considered within the army, and did not alert the political leaders
concerning the flaws in the decisions and the way they were made.
16. As a result of our investigation, we make a number of structural and
institutional recommendations, which require urgent attention:
a. The improvement of the quality of discussions and decision making
within the government through strengthening and deepening staff work; strict
enforcement of the prohibition of leaks; improving the knowledge base of all
members of the government on core issues of Israel's challenges, and orderly
procdures for presentation of issues for discussion and resolution.
b. Full incorporation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in security
decisions with political and diplomatic aspects.
c. Substantial improvement in the functioning of the National Security
Council, the establishment of a national assessment
team, and creating a center for crises management in the Prime Minister's
Office.
17. We regard it is of great importance to make findings, reach
conclusions and present recommendations on the other critical issues which
emerged in this war. We will cover them in the final report, which we strive
to conclude soon. ...
For the entire text, click here for IMRA.
Monday, April 30, 2007
Olmert's greatest miss-calculation!
Last summer, when it was clear to everyone, even the Israeli Government, that there had to be a "commission of inquiry" to "investigate" and affix blame for the badly-managed war, the public wanted an "independent" commission. That wasn't what Prime Minister Olmert wanted. He did not want ambitious politicians, from the coalition and opposition and "independent do-gooders" to have control over the investigation.
So Olmert appointed his own "inspection team," the Israeli public was disappointed. It was just another example of the political corruption. Everyone expected the Winograd Commission, which met in secret, unlike Israel's previous commissions, to find ways of white-washing the disaster. That's common sense, nu?
But this is Israel, where common sense does not rule. Just like the elections that brought Arik Sharon to power, when we celebrated the election of pro-Eretz Yisrael politicians. We were certain that this new government would be the best ever. But what did we get? We got Disengagement, the unilateral withdrawal from Gush Katif and the Northern Sinai! Jewish communities were destroyed, and thousands of innocent, patriotic Israeli citizens were exiled from their homes. Their businesses were destroyed, and now almost two years later, most are listlessly, idling their days in "caravilla"-refugee camps, buying food with the lasts cents of their "compensation."
And what did the Winograd Report say?
Winograd Blames Olmert, Peretz, Halutz
Winograd report: PM was unprepared
Olmert, Peretz, Halutz failed in their roles, war report says
War probe report accuses Olmert of 'severe failure' PM to Kadima: I have no intention of resigning
Yes, it put most of the blame on the politicians in charge, Ehud Olmert and Amir Peretz.
Now, of course we all knew that Olmert and Peretz were out of their league, trying to run the country. That's no surprise. The report also had some serious things to say about the top army brass. Personally, I think that the ones most to blame are Ehud Barak and Kadima MK Shaul Mofaz. Barak, former Chief of Staff and the one competing with Olmert as Israel's worst Prime Minister. Remember that he was PM when the intifada became most deadly, and his government didn't last. Now he considers himself rehabilitated and is running against Peretz and others to head the Labor Party. Mofaz is a former COS and also Minister of Defense. They built today's IDF.
The question is:
If the same people had been appointed by the Knesset or courts as an independent commission, they most probably would have been more even-handed.
Of course, Olmert's still in power and I'm pretty sure that the government, or at least this Knesset, will hold onto their seats until the two-year pension kicks in. ! הם לא פריירים Hem lo friyerim! They're not fools to miss out on such a good deal, nu?
But in the meantime, down in the Heartland, we're working hard and praying.
If a cool operator like Olmert can miss-calculate, what about ordinary folks like us?
So Olmert appointed his own "inspection team," the Israeli public was disappointed. It was just another example of the political corruption. Everyone expected the Winograd Commission, which met in secret, unlike Israel's previous commissions, to find ways of white-washing the disaster. That's common sense, nu?
But this is Israel, where common sense does not rule. Just like the elections that brought Arik Sharon to power, when we celebrated the election of pro-Eretz Yisrael politicians. We were certain that this new government would be the best ever. But what did we get? We got Disengagement, the unilateral withdrawal from Gush Katif and the Northern Sinai! Jewish communities were destroyed, and thousands of innocent, patriotic Israeli citizens were exiled from their homes. Their businesses were destroyed, and now almost two years later, most are listlessly, idling their days in "caravilla"-refugee camps, buying food with the lasts cents of their "compensation."
And what did the Winograd Report say?
Winograd Blames Olmert, Peretz, Halutz
Winograd report: PM was unprepared
Olmert, Peretz, Halutz failed in their roles, war report says
War probe report accuses Olmert of 'severe failure' PM to Kadima: I have no intention of resigning
Yes, it put most of the blame on the politicians in charge, Ehud Olmert and Amir Peretz.
Now, of course we all knew that Olmert and Peretz were out of their league, trying to run the country. That's no surprise. The report also had some serious things to say about the top army brass. Personally, I think that the ones most to blame are Ehud Barak and Kadima MK Shaul Mofaz. Barak, former Chief of Staff and the one competing with Olmert as Israel's worst Prime Minister. Remember that he was PM when the intifada became most deadly, and his government didn't last. Now he considers himself rehabilitated and is running against Peretz and others to head the Labor Party. Mofaz is a former COS and also Minister of Defense. They built today's IDF.
The question is:
Why didn't the Winograd Commission concentrate its criticism on the army?I think that because most of us had such little faith in them, it bothered them. The commission is made up of good people, and they wanted to show that Olmert didn't control them. That's why they made a point of blaming him over all others.
If the same people had been appointed by the Knesset or courts as an independent commission, they most probably would have been more even-handed.
Of course, Olmert's still in power and I'm pretty sure that the government, or at least this Knesset, will hold onto their seats until the two-year pension kicks in. ! הם לא פריירים Hem lo friyerim! They're not fools to miss out on such a good deal, nu?
But in the meantime, down in the Heartland, we're working hard and praying.
If a cool operator like Olmert can miss-calculate, what about ordinary folks like us?
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