Quoted here is the key, the gist of the report. For the entire text, click here for IMRA.8. The core of the interim report is a detailed examination of the
decisions of senior political and military decision-makers concerning the
decision to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the two soldiers on
the morning of July 12th. We start with the decision of the government on
the fateful evening of the 12th to authorize a sharp military response, and
end with the speech of the Prime Minister in the Knesset on July 17th, when
he officially presented the campaign and its goals. These decisions were
critical and constitutive, and therefore deserve separate investigation. We
should note that these decisions enjoyed broad support within the
government, the Knesset and the public throughout this period.
9. Despite this broad support, we determine that there are very
serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We impose
the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the
minister of defence and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a
decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they
were made. Howwever,, there are many others who share responsibility for the
mistakes we found in these decisions and for their background conditions.
10. The main failures in the decisions made and the decision-making
processes can be summed up as follows:
a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike
was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan,
based on carefull study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena
. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed
the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant
political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would
inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was
not other effective military response to such missile attacks than an
extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the
missiles were fired - which would have a high "cost" and which did not
enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with
the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.
b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government
did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing
the policy of 'containment', or combining political and diplomatic moves
with military strikes below the 'escalation level', or military preparations
without immediage military action -- so as to maintain for Israel the full
range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in
strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more
comprehensive and encompassing picture.
c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through
ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that
ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it.
The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing
its nature and implications. They authorized to commence a military campaign
without considering how to exit it.
d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not
be achieved, and in part were not achieveable by the authorized modes of
military action.
e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action
possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action,
and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early
mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a
ground operation would be required.
f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they
failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality
on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it
was publicly states that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But
the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement.
11. The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the
Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the
(outgoing) Chief of Staff. We single out these three because it is likely
that had any of them acted better - the decisions in the relevant period and
the ways they were made, as well as the outcome of the war, would have been
significantly better.
12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.
a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility
for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army. His
responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war
stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led
the decisions which were taken.
b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that
no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one.
Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of
the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options
available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation
with others, especially outside the the IDF, despite not having experience
in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not
adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him
before the fateful decisions of July 12th.
c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the
campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no
serious discussion of the relationships between these goals and the
authorized modes of military action. He nade a personal contribution to the
fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.
d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans once it became clear that
the assumptions and expectations of Israel's actions were not realistic and
were not materializing.
e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment,
responsibility and prudence.
13. The Minister of Defence is the minister responsible for overseeing
the IDF, and he is a senior member in the group of leaders in charge of
political-military affairs.
a. The Minister of Defence did not have knowledge or experience in
military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good
knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve
political goals.
b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period
without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional
experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did
not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he
attended.
c. The Minister of Defence did not act within a strategic conception of
the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF's operational plans and
did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF;
and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action
presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions
made was mainly pointillist and operational. He did not put on the table -
and did not demand presentation - of serious strategic options for
discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.
d. The Minister of Defence did not develop an independent assessment
of the implications of the complexity of the front for Israel's proper
response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations between military and
diplomatic moves within it. His lack of experience and knowledge prevented
him from challenging in a competent way both the IDF, over which he was in
charge, and the Prime Minister.
e. In all these ways, the Minister of Defence failed in fulfilling his
functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defence during the war
impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges.
14. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the supreme commander of the IDF, and the
main source of information concerning the army, its plans, abilities and
recommendations presented to the political echelon. Furthermore, the COS's
personal involvement with decision making within the army and in
coordination with the political echelon were dominant.
a. The army and the COS were not prepared for the event of the
abduction despite recurring alerts. When the abduction happened, he
responded impulsively. He did not alert the political leaders to the
complexity of the situation, and did not present information, assessments
and plans that were available in the IDF at various levels of planning and
approval and which would have enabled a better response to the challenges.
b. Among other things, the COS did not alert the political echelon to
the serious shortcomings in the preparedness and the fitness of the armed
forces for an extensive ground operation, if that became necessary. In
addition, he did not clarify that the military assessments and analyses of
the arena were that a military strike against Hezbollah will with a high
probability make such a move necessary.
c. The COS's responsibility is aggravated by the fact that he knew well
that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate
knowledge and experience in these matters, and by the fact that he had led
them to believe that the IDF was ready and prepared and had operational
plans fitting the situation.
d. The COS did not provide adequate responses to serious reservation
about his recommendations raised by ministers and others during the first
days of the campaign, and he did not present to the political leaders the
internal debates within the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals
and the authorized modes of actions.
e. In all these the Chief of Staff failed in his duties as commander in
chief of the army and as a critical part of the political-military
leadership, and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility and
judgment.
15. Concomitantly we determine that the failures listed here, and in the
outcomes of the war, had many other partners.
a. The complexity of the Lebanon scene is basically outside Israel's
control.
b. The ability of Hezbollah to sit 'on the border', its ability to
dictate the moment of escalation, and the growth of its military abilities
and missile arsenal increased significantly as a result of Israel's
unilateral withdrawal in May 2000 (which was not followed, as had been
hoped, by The Lebanese Army deploying on the border with Israel.
c. The shortcomings in the preparedness and the training of the army,
its operational doctrine, and various flaws in its organizational culture
and structure, were all the responsibility of the military commanders and
political leaders in charge years before the present Prime Minister,
Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff took office.
d. On the political-security strategic level, the lack of preparedness
was also caused by the failure to update and fully articulate Israel's
security strategy doctrine, in the fullest sense of that term, so that it
could not serve as a basis for coping comprehensively will all the
challenges facing Israel. Responsibility for this lack of an updates
national security strategy lies with Israel's governments over the years.
This omission made it difficult to devise an immediate proper response to
the abduction, because it led to stressing an immediate and sharp military
strike. If the response had been derived from a more comprehensive security
strategy, it would have been easier to take into account Israel's overall
balance of strengths and vulnerabilities, including the preparedness of the
civil population.
e. Another factor which largely contributed to the failures is the
weakness of the high staff work available to the political leadership. This
weakness existed under all previous Prime Ministers and this continuing
failure is the responsibility of these PMs and their cabinets. The current
political leadership did not act in a way that could compensate for this
lack, and did not rely sufficiently on other bodies within and outside the
security system that could have helped it.
f. Israel's government in its plenum failed in its political function
of taking full responsibility for its decisions. It did not explore and seek
adequate response for various reservations that were raised, and authorized
an immediate military strike that was not thought-through and suffered from
over-reliance on the judgment of the primary decision-makers.
g. Members of the IDF's general staff who were familiar with the
assessments and intelligence concerning the Lebanon front, and the serious
deficiencies in preparedness and training, did not insist that these should
be considered within the army, and did not alert the political leaders
concerning the flaws in the decisions and the way they were made.
16. As a result of our investigation, we make a number of structural and
institutional recommendations, which require urgent attention:
a. The improvement of the quality of discussions and decision making
within the government through strengthening and deepening staff work; strict
enforcement of the prohibition of leaks; improving the knowledge base of all
members of the government on core issues of Israel's challenges, and orderly
procdures for presentation of issues for discussion and resolution.
b. Full incorporation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in security
decisions with political and diplomatic aspects.
c. Substantial improvement in the functioning of the National Security
Council, the establishment of a national assessment
team, and creating a center for crises management in the Prime Minister's
Office.
17. We regard it is of great importance to make findings, reach
conclusions and present recommendations on the other critical issues which
emerged in this war. We will cover them in the final report, which we strive
to conclude soon. ...
For the entire text, click here for IMRA.
