Wednesday, October 25, 2006

If the NY Times doesn't like it, it must be good, and other important news

Israel has been performing systematic Hari Kari or self-mutilations for quite a few years in order to "win the love" of the Arabs who are doing everything to destroy her. It's worse than those miss-guided women who try to be "beautiful" by anorexia and bulimia.

To make matters worse international leaders and media are cheering Israel on, shouting:

You're too fat!
Take it off! Take off more!!!

Israel has become so weak from this that the majority of the population still thinks it must "diet." Notice the word "diet" includes the word die!!!

And here's some more news to help you lose your appetite:

Tuesday, October 24, 2006

Egypt plans to launch its nuclear program

CAIRO [MENL] -- Egypt plans to launch its nuclear program.

Officials said President Hosni Mubarak has ordered the start of the nuclear
project over the next month. They said the program would focus on civilian
projects, particularly nuclear energy and research.

"No one protests Egypt's peaceful, clear and transparent nuclear program,"
Egyptian Electricity Minister Hassan Yunis said.
On Monday, Yunis told the state-owned Al Akhbar daily that Egypt would
construct nuclear power stations in a project approved by the International
Atomic Energy Agency. The minister said this would be part of what he termed
a "permanent and vast nuclear program."
NOTE: The above is not the full item.
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Monday, October 23, 2006

Asad's Declarations: Ambiguous Words, Clear Meaning

Tel Aviv Notes No. 189 October 23, 2006

Aiman Mansour
Institute for National Security Studies

The recent series of interviews with Syrian President Bashar Asad in Arab
and Western media reveals the extent of changes in the Middle East, in
general, and Syria, in particular, in the wake of the confrontation between
Israel and Hizbullah in the summer of 2006. Before that conflict, Asad
hardly ever mentioned "Israeli aggression against Syria that can end in war"
or the "state of alert" in the Syrian army, but since then, Asad has
repeatedly stressed the readiness of his military forces.

The latest confrontation, whatever the assessment may be of its tactical
aspects, is seen by many in the Arab and Muslim world as Israel's worst
strategic failure since the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Israel's inability to
destroy Hizbullah's organizational and physical infrastructure has only
strengthened the belief of many that Israel is a weak entity that can be
shaken to its very foundations through violence and terror. The perception
that the summer war ended in a victory for Hizbullah has led the Alawite
regime in Damascus to tighten its links with the "victor" and even to signal
a readiness to adopt Hizbullah's operational methods and policies.

Assad's latest declarations reflect his (and his regime's) growing
self-confidence. From his perspective, Syria is now in a "win-win"
situation; every development will play to its advantage. A glance through
the Syrian prism at three possible scenarios shows how might all be expected
to develop positively:

1. initiation of negotiations for a comprehensive Syrian-Israeli peace
agreement - Since Assad sees himself as someone who "bet" on the right cards
(closer ties with Iran and support for Hizbullah) and won the strategic
contest with Israel, he can go into negotiations with maximal demands: total
Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, "dipping his feet" in the Sea of
Galilee, and major Israeli concessions on the Palestinian issue. Extracting
these gains from a weakened Israel unwilling to risk a clash with Syria
would allow the Syrian President to depict himself as one who refused to
make concessions in a political process and, consequently, did not harm his
regime's legitimacy or do damage to collective Arab dignity;

2. launching a "popular struggle" to regain the Golan - If negotiations do
not begin (or begin but break off in failure), Syria might resort to a
limited violent struggle. In an interview with Dubai Television on 23
August, Asad explicitly declared: "The limits of our patience will be shown
soon and I have already said that the present generation is the last
generation prepared to accept the peace process. Therefore, our patience
will run out with this generation. That means that [when patience runs out]
the people will turn to resistance, which is a popular and not governmental
path." Even if that "resistance" is not so "popular" and is actually
institutionalized and subject to the absolute control of the Syrian security
agencies, such a struggle would attract support, not only in the Arab and
Muslim arenas - because it would be a struggle to restore conquered land and
protect Arab honor in the long run -- but also in the international arena -
because the Golan is seen as Israeli-occupied territory. Such a
confrontation would also tie Israel's hands. On the one hand, it would lack
the international legitimacy to launch a full-scale military attack on
Syria. On the other hand, at least in the eyes of the Syrian regime, Israel
would suffer from the same inefficiencies and weaknesses against a guerrilla
force that it experienced in Lebanon.

3. a major Israeli war against Syria - Since Asad sees Israel's power to
threaten as having been eroded by the results of the campaign against
Hizbullah, he may suspect Israel of wanting to rehabilitate its reputation
by launching a major military action against Syria. The Syrian ruler judges
that his army is prepared for such an eventuality and makes frequent
declarations about Syrian readiness. Blocking an Israeli military
initiative would enhance the regime's legitimacy, bring honor to Syria and
further discredit Israel's deterrent; yet another military setback might
well bring Israel to acquiesce in Syrian demands and permit the regime to
achieve all its goals in negotiations. But even if the Syrian army were
unable to inflict a defeat on Israel, Asad apparently assumes that the
survival of his regime would not be threatened because he would still be
portrayed as someone who stood up to "Zionist aggression."

Regime survival is the highest value in Syrian national security policy and
that prompts Asad and those working under him to do everything to strengthen
their legitimacy. In the eyes of the regime, strengthening ties with the
Hizbullah-Iran axis has already borne fruit in this regard and all that
remains now is to pick the fruit, whether by political or military means.

Given the Arab and Muslim perception of Israeli failure in Lebanon, Syria is
now trying to launch a policy that will change the status quo vis-a-vis
Israel. The regime would prefer to bring about that change by negotiating
from the position of strength that it believes it now holds in light of
Israel's defeat. But if negotiations do not take place or, alternatively,
if they fail because of Israeli refusal to satisfy Syrian demands, that
could bring the regime to adopt Hizbullah's methods and shatter the quiet
that has prevailed along the Syrian-Israeli line of separation for more than
three decades.

Tel Aviv Notes is published by
The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
& The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
through the generosity of Sari and Israel Roizman, Philadelphia

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