Winograd Committee January 30, 2008 remarks

Thanks to IMRA

Wednesday, January 30, 2008
Full text: Winograd Committee January 30, 2008 remarks

Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: Take the time to at least read this and think
about it for 60 seconds before opening your mouth and you are way ahead of
the overwhelming majority of talking heads appearing on the various Israeli
television channels tonight.
There is one particularly bizarre phrase in the remarks of Judge Eliyahu
Winograd: "We should also note that the war had significant diplomatic
achievements. SC resolution 1701, and the fact it was adopted unanimously,
were an achievement for Israel. This conclusion stands even if it turns out
that only a part of the stipulations of the resolution were implemented or
will be implemented, and even if it could have been foreseen that some of
them would not be implemented."

Does this mean that Winograd considers a piece of paper to be a "
significant diplomatic achievement" even if it can be foreseen that the
piece of paper won't be implemented?

This is an extremely dangerous position to take, given that there is
tremendous concern that the current "piece process" is exactly that: an
attempt to reach a photo opportunity signing ceremony in which a piece of
paper is signed with great fanfare even though it can be foreseen that the
piece of paper won't be implemented.

Winograd Committee Press Release - January 30, 2008

January 30, 2008
Press Release
Good Evening.

1. About an hour ago we submitted the Final Report of the Commission to
Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006 to the Prime minister, Mr. Ehud
Olmert, and to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak.

2. The task given to us was difficult and complex. It involved the
examination of events in 34 days of fighting, and the scrutiny of events
before the war, since the IDF had left Lebanon in 2000. This covered
extensive, charged and complex facts, unprecedented in any previous
Commission of Inquiry.

3. The fact that the Government of Israel opted for such an examination, and
that the army conducted a large number of inquires of a variety of military
events, are a sign of strength, and an indication that the political and
military leaders of Israel are willing to expose themselves to critical
review and to painful but required mending.

4. We have included in the classified version of the Report all the relevant
facts we have found concerning the 2nd Lebanon war, systematically and in a
chronological order. This presentation of the factual basis was an important
part of our work. It is reasonable to assume that no single decision maker
had access to a similar factual basis. In this task we had a unique
advantage over others who have written about this war, since we had access
to a lot of primary and comprehensive material, and the opportunity to
clarify the facts by questioning many witnesses, commanders and soldiers,
including bereaved families.

5. For obvious reasons, the unclassified Report does not include the many
facts that cannot be revealed for reasons of protecting the state's security
and foreign affairs. We tried, nonetheless, to balance between the wish to
present the public with a meaningful picture of the events and the needs of
security. We should note that we did not take the mere fact that some data
has already been published in the media as a reason for including it in our
unclassified Report.

6. We, the members of the Commission, acted according to the main objectives
for which the Commission was established - to respond to the bad feelings of
the Israeli public of a crisis and disappointment caused by the results of
the 2nd Lebanon war, and from the way it was managed by the political and
military echelons; and the wish to draw lessons from the failings of the war
and its flaws, and to repair what is required, quickly and resolutely. We
regarded as most important to investigate deeply what had happened, as a key
to drawing lessons for the future, and their implementation.

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